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blacklist [Prob.  < to blackball, to vote against.  In Brit. Club 
society, one blackball (vote against) was traditionally 
enough to exclude.]  n. A list of persons to be shunned or 
proscribed in one way or another. –v. To place a person’s 
name on such a list. 
  HISTORIC.  Section 2 of the British Licensing Act of 
1902 authorized the preparation of a list of habitual 
drunkards in various cities and areas, and the distribution of 
that blacklist to liquor dealers, with a prohibition of liquor 
sales to people on the list. 
  In a city the size of London, a drunkard could walk away 
from his home grounds to a pub that would not recognize 
him, but c. 1900 the British poor were not given to travel, 
and in country places, a local blacklist would cover all the 
pubs a neighborhood sot might get to. 
  Sometime before 1902, however, American mine owners 
and manufacturers, along with their Pinkertons and private 
goons, were preparing and distributing blacklists of workers 
who were not to be hired.  Employers justified such lists as a 
way of getting rid of “troublemakers” (for which read 
“union organizers and sympathizers”), but no reason was 
required for blacklisting a man, and once so listed, he was 
unemployable, at least within a given industry and 
geographical area. (Ciardi 1983, pg. 25) 
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I. Introduction 
Although she was discharged a year ago, Sarah Nome will not leave the San 
Rafael Medical Center, (Wagenseil 2005).  The 82-year-old is healthy, but she has no 
place to go if she leaves the hospital.  No nursing homes nearby, not even the home that 
sent her to San Rafael to get psychiatric testing more than a year ago, will take her into 
residence.  Why?  Because she has sued every nursing home that she has lived in, and 
“none of them want to take her.” 
 John S. Jones, a Texas Radiologist has created an online database of people who 
have filed medical malpractice lawsuits, (Feder 2004).  Jones’ goal for the site was to 
provide information to doctors about the malpractice history of some patients, allowing 
the doctors to choose whether to treat the patient based on that information.  ‘”They can 
sue, but they can’t hide,” the Web site proclaims. “Malpractice plaintiffs must now 
permanently bear the burden of their public claims.”’ 
 Darlene Salerno, a dedicated patron of Express clothing stores, was recently 
denied the ability to return some items of clothing she had purchased a few days before, 
(Feder 2004).  She was told that her account had been flagged for “excessive returns” and 
she no longer had the ability to return any items she purchased.  Considering that she has 
spent nearly $20,000 on Express clothes in the past ten years, it is no surprise that she 
returned more items than other customers, (she buys more than normal customers), but it 
is surprising that the Express database would red flag a good customer. 
These three examples are a few of many incidences of blacklisting that reveal 
efforts of businesses and doctors to control those whom they sell to and treat, 
respectively.  The emergence of systems to identify individuals for denial of service is a 
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result of the desire of the list creators to manage the losses caused by these individuals.  
Systems such as these can be generally referred to as blacklists. This term that gained 
recognition in the 1950’s due to McCarthyism, but blacklists have a much more extensive 
history.  A blacklist is somewhat formally defined as “Concerted action by employers to 
deny employment to someone suspected of unacceptable opinions or behavior,” (Hirsch, 
Kett and Trefil).  Blacklists in their earliest form provided employers with a means to 
identify undesirable employees and exclude them from employment.  This paper 
examines the existence of blacklists in two specific sectors -- the retail sector and the 
medical sector -- through the lens of new institutional economics.  Two questions will be 
studied.  The first is: what motivates the formation of blacklists?  The second is: how do 
the laws of a society apply to blacklists? 
I. A. Why Form Blacklists? : Increasing the Profit Margin 
As is true with any business, retailers are always looking for new and better ways 
to manage their sales and customer base to maximize profits.  One of the strategies to 
improve profitability involves differentiating between profitable and unprofitable 
customers, or, as Best Buy managers often refer to them, “angels and devils,” 
(McWilliams 2005).  Retailers are beginning to develop blacklists of the devil customers.  
These retailers will then employ the lists to deny devils access to certain services, for 
example, return or exchange services for goods they have purchased.  These blacklists are 
created by compiling information about a customer’s habits, such as how often they 
return items and whether or not they typically purchase items on sale or for full price.  
Collection of this kind of information has been greatly facilitated by improving 
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technology systems and increasing use of credit to make purchases; (credit purchases are 
easier to track than cash). 
        One example of implementation of a blacklist system is the story of Darlene 
Salerno, which was described at the beginning of this paper. If a retailer can detect a 
pattern of buying items and returning them shortly thereafter for a full refund, (people 
may do this so they can wear an outfit once and then return it), the retailer can refuse the 
return or otherwise restrict that person’s return privileges.  This cuts down on the costs 
associated with processing returns and marking down returned merchandise. The Express 
clothing stores have recently enacted this policy on people who return items frequently, 
such as Ms. Salerno.  If the system does not blacklist and thus alienate a valuable 
customer such as Salerno, it will be a valuable money saver.  These systems can also be 
extremely valuable for catching shoplifters who steal items and then return them for a 
cash refund, although the primary use is to discourage expensive activities like returning 
and exchanging. 
I. B. Why Form Blacklists? : A Medical Necessity 
One of President Bush’s major campaign issues was increasing health care costs 
and the negative effect they have on Americans.  He promised to work to curb the 
increases, specifically through medical malpractice reform, (Hogstrom 2004).  There 
seems to be little that consumers can do to reduce their healthcare costs – when someone 
needs medical attention, there are no substitutes.  The increasing costs of health care tend 
to fall instead on the providers.  Health care providers are constantly trying to control 
costs to maintain profitability.  Health management organizations are a good example of 
an attempt to control care and thus control costs.  However, some of the increasing costs 
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that health care providers face are due to the costs of medical malpractice lawsuits.  
According to the Congressional Budget Office, malpractice insurance premiums rose by 
about 15% for all physicians nationwide, (www.cbo.gov).  The increases for certain 
specialties have been even more dramatic than the average for the profession.  Premiums 
for gynecologists and internists have increased roughly 22% and 33%, respectively.  
There are two causes of the premium increases.  The first is that investments made by 
insurance companies have had lower expected returns.  The second is that insurance 
companies have faced increased payouts for medical malpractice claims.  Both of these 
costs are, of course, passed on to the physician.  Physicians are thus motivated to reduce 
their premiums by reducing malpractice risk.  Blacklists may begin to play a larger role in 
helping health care providers control costs and risk associated with medical malpractice.  
Health care providers can create blacklists of patients with undesirable histories - for 
example, those patients known to have filed malpractice claims against doctors - and use 
these lists to decide whom they will or will not treat.  This is similar to the retail 
blacklisting, however with more serious consequences for the blacklisted person, who 
may be denied medical treatment.  The justification for denial of treatment is that the 
patient is too “risky”, and the doctor cannot afford to treat them. 
This paper seeks to examine these blacklists through an economist’s eyes, 
specifically, these lists represent a development related to new institutional economics.  
The lists are a form of information transmission that has been developed in response to 
the needs of the users.  They carry valuable information about the expected behavior of a 
patron or patient.  Game theory can be applied to the lists as well.  It can be used to 
model how the agents in the situation will behave, and how this should be considered 
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when evaluating the information the lists provide.  Given that people know that certain 
behavior can put them on the blacklist, how, if at all, will they alter their behavior?  
Lastly, law and economics will be used to briefly assess the economic benefit of these 
lists to society.  In economic terms, are the lists efficient?  Are they equitable?  How has 
the law dealt with similar developments, and have those decisions been fair and 
equitable? 
 Blacklists such as those discussed above are a fairly new emergence.  Thus, there 
is little research on blacklists per se.  In some ways, consumer credit is analogous to 
blacklists, especially when one considers the type of information credit conveys, the ways 
in which people behave in regards to credit, and the ways that the law has regulated credit 
that may be applied to blacklists.  However, the impact of blacklists on retail and medical 
markets should not be confused with the impact credit reports have on the credit markets 
– credit markets would probably not function without credit reports, whereas blacklists in 
these examples are simply a means to controlling the customers and patients.  Without 
the lists, the retail and medical markets would and will continue to function.   
The research pertaining to new institutional economics will focus on the role of 
consumer credit in the retail world.  Once the role of consumer credit has been 
established, it will be used to infer the role of the lists in transmitting information to 
retailers and doctors.  It will also be necessary to describe the differences between 
traditional consumer credit and the blacklists, focusing on how retailers, doctors, 
consumers and patients might use the information to make decisions.  This decision 
making process leads nicely into a discussion about the way game theory can be used to 
predict both the list creators’ and the patrons’ behavior.  Do these lists discourage the 
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“bad” behavior that differentiates devils from angels?  Will devils change their behavior 
to avoid being blacklisted?  Just as importantly, will angels change their behavior for fear 
of ending up on such lists?  For example, what will Darlene Salerno do now that she 
knows that even being a profitable, repeat customer for Express stores can land her on a 
returns blacklist? 
 Examining the ways in which the law treats credit reports and privacy issues 
related to consumer credit will be helpful in identifying the legal issues that creating such 
lists entails.  There are specific privacy rights enumerated in the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act that ensure that individuals have the ability to correct bad information, an efficiency 
promoting activity.  Would efficiency be promoted if similar rights to be granted to those 
who may end up on the blacklists? For example, are those who build the lists allowed to 
provide that information to others, like other retailers, doctors or consumers?  Are the 
creators of the lists obligated to provide people with some way to get off the list, or at 
least provide their version of the story?  The law has been generous to people with bad 
credit in this respect.  Very often people have the right to refute bad credit or comment on 
“adverse times” in their credit report.  It may therefore be deemed fair to allow 
blacklisted people the right to refute their inclusion on those lists. 
 In general, modern and historical blacklists provide for interesting examples of 
new institutional economic principles at work. 
II. Literature Review and History of Blacklists 
II. A. A Brief History 
 Ever since Joe McCarthy announced that “I have here in my hand a list of two 
hundred and five people that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of 
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the communist party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the 
State Department,” the term “blacklist” generally has negative connotations, 
(www.brainyquote.com).  Among Americans, the term provokes thoughts of 
McCarthyism and the Hollywood blacklists of the 1950’s, (Hirsch et al. 1988).  At that 
time, public figures accused of association with communist organizations were 
ostracized, and many had their careers ruined by the accusations.  In some cases, the 
accusations were true, in others they were not.   
An earlier incidence of blacklists is described by the passage at the beginning of 
this paper.  Blacklists were authorized by the British government in 1902.  These 
blacklists were distributed to local liquor stores and identified individuals known to be 
drunkards to whom liquor could not be sold.  Use of blacklists is most common among 
employers.  Employees known to have undesirable traits, especially sympathy and 
support for unions, are blacklisted from employment in a region.  Use of blacklists in this 
respect displays a rational effort to protect against a threatening organization, certainly an 
understandable use.  However, the most common connotation of blacklists is negative 
due to the association with McCarthyism.  
In this paper, the connotation should not be perceived as good or bad.  The term is 
simply a convenient way to refer to a process of information collection and action based 
upon that information that have goals similar in spirit to the goals of historic blacklists – 
namely identification and exclusion of undesirables from certain privileges.  Blacklists 
are a characteristic example of an institution developed to deal with information 
asymmetries, thus it is appropriate to study them using the tools of new institutional 
economics.  Blacklists can serve an extremely useful purpose because they aggregate 
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information in an easily disseminated form.  Whether or not the use is “ethical” is a 
subjective question.  Blacklisting for political reasons is almost universally opposed, but 
the issue becomes less clear when the discussion turns to blacklisting for possibly 
legitimate reasons.  Should employers be able to blacklist potential troublemakers?  
Should retailers be able to blacklist unprofitable customers?  And perhaps the most 
controversial question: should doctors be able to blacklist patients and deny them medical 
treatment based on their malpractice lawsuit history? 
II. B. New Institutional Economics and Blacklist Development 
New institutional economics is primarily concerned with the way that information 
is distributed in markets.  Independently, many markets will develop severe information 
asymmetry problems.  Societies develop institutions to deal with information 
asymmetries that hinder market activities.  Joseph Stiglitz articulates the difference 
between the perfectly competitive way of thinking, (players in a market have perfect 
information), and the information asymmetries that we see in real life.  He specifically 
mentions the loan market and the effects that information asymmetries have on them,  
“If lenders know perfectly the risks associated with each borrower, 
this (adverse selection), would matter little; each borrower would be 
charged an appropriate risk premium.  It is because lenders do not know 
the default probabilities of borrowers perfectly that this process of adverse 
selection has such important consequences,” (Stiglitz 2001).   
 
In the case of consumer credit, a credit score communicates information to many 
parties, (for example, potential lenders and employers), about a person’s financial history 
and can provide grounds for speculation about their future financial dealings and quality 
of character.  Credit reports are basically a person’s entire financial history.  They display 
raw information about a person’s payment history and existing credit lines.  Credit 
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reports are widely available and screeners can interpret their contents to decide whether 
an individual is an appropriate risk – will they be a good borrower, a good employee, a 
good tenant, etc?  Overcoming the information gap between proprietor and customer has 
allowed some markets to function more efficiently because proprietors can make good 
guesses at the answers to the questions posed above. 
III. Validation for Two Examples of Modern Blacklists 
III. A. Retail Blacklists 
 Blacklists are a kind of credit report used by retailers to either grant or deny 
services.  They consist of data about customer purchasing history collected by a merchant 
or by a third party for the merchant.  In the case of the Express, Return Exchange Inc. 
provides this service.  Although they refused to divulge any information to the author of 
this paper, the spirit of the customer databases is expressed well by Return Exchange 
Inc.’s website: 
“Return Exchange’s product is the answer to standardizing return 
authorization consistently and effectively. With this product, merchants 
are able to enforce a consistent return policy while monitoring consumer 
return transaction patterns to identify fraudulent and/or abusive customers. 
Bringing ease-of-use rules and predictive statistical modeling together … 
Through the use of (the product), merchants are given the ability to access 
a basic rule set to enforce their return policy. The authenticity of returns is 
automatically verified while ensuring compliance with all your return 
policies…  If a pattern of unusual return activity is detected, a decline 
code is sent … and the consumer is offered a courtesy notice directing 
them to contact customer service at The Return Exchange.” 
Based on a customer’s return history, a pending return can be denied or allowed.  
But why deny a customer’s return?  Aside from the obvious problem of shoplifters who 
return stolen merchandise for cash refunds, there is also the problem of overhead 
associated with returns.   
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Accepting returns is expensive.  Some of the costs involved include writing off 
the merchandise, (it typically must be sold at a deep discount), paying employees to 
service customers with returns, and developing and maintaining internal controls to 
ensure honesty of employees conducting such transactions.  Internal controls are 
necessary to ensure that employees are not facilitating the defrauding of a store by 
helping people exploit the returns system.  These extra costs eat away at a retailer’s profit 
margins.  Retailers are probably more defensive of their margins especially in today’s 
climate of thrift – customers use the improved information and choices made available by 
tools such as the internet to determine the best prices.  They then use these prices as 
leverage to demand lower prices from retailers, (Masters 2005).  With the interests of the 
retailers and the customer at odds, it is not surprising that retailers look to cost cutting 
rather than increased sales as a source of increased profitability.   
 Best Buy has put itself in a unique position to be exploited. Although it does not 
yet employ blacklists, they may be an effective way to deal with the problems created by 
people who take advantage of Best Buy’s customer service programs.  Thanks to the 
“Low Price Guarantee” provided by Best Buy, people can find basement deal prices on 
the internet and demand that Best Buy match them.  It is not unusual for these people to 
turn around and sell the items online for a profit – a form of arbitrage.  Not only do these 
customers make it a practice to buy items only when they are on sale, but when they sell 
these items online, they actually reduce the market for the items in Best Buy’s stores.  As 
a result, Best Buy loses money in two ways: the first is the money lost on the original 
sale, as it was sold at a lower than marked price, and the second is the money lost when a 
customer who may have bought from Best Buy at full price instead purchases an item 
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online from the devil customer.  Not all customers plan this kind of arbitrage, but even if 
the intentions of the customer are not nefarious, returns of electronic merchandise can be 
especially costly for the same reasons that returns of clothing are. 
III. B. Medical Blacklists 
 Medical blacklists are a bit different from retailing blacklists, and will no doubt 
become more controversial if they proliferate.  The blacklist developed by the radiologist 
in Texas, Dr. John S. Jones, posted the results seven years worth of data collection in the 
form of a patient blacklist on a website so that other doctors could screen their patients.  
Those patients who have filed medical malpractice claims risk having their names put on 
the list and could then be denied treatment by doctors.  The availability of this 
information helps doctors to decide whether a patient is a good or bad risk.  Concern 
about medical malpractice lawsuits and rising insurance premiums provides large 
incentives for doctors to utilize lists such as this.  Although information about court 
proceedings is public and thus Dr. Jones is not violating privacy rules, both patients and 
doctors are concerned about the implications of medical blacklists; many doctors refuse 
to utilize the lists on ethical grounds. 
 There may also be grounds for development of blacklists that consumers might 
use to select physicians.  The potential usefulness of such a list is illustrated by the tragic 
case of Kay Kelly Cregan, (Buettner 2005).  This Irish mother came to New York to 
undergo a nose job and face lift after reading an article about a plastic surgeon in New 
York.  Unfortunately, the plastic surgeon she selected, Dr. Michael Sachs, has the worst 
medical malpractice record in the state of New York.  Shortly after her surgery ended, 
Mrs. Cregan went into cardiac arrest in Dr. Sach’s recovery room.  She was brain dead 
Quinn, Tess 
The Economics of Blacklists 
15 
when she arrived at the hospital shortly after going into cardiac arrest, and was taken off 
of life support a few days later.  If Mrs. Cregan had taken the time to research her 
physician, she may have found out about Dr. Sach’s dangerous record.  However, the 
transaction costs associated with doing so must have been too high, and the result of her 
lack of research was death.    Perhaps a physician blacklist is in order so that patients 
have a mechanism to assess the risk of going to a certain doctor for treatment. 
IV. Game Theory Analysis of Blacklists  
Game theory can provide more insight into the behavioral effects of blacklists.  In 
a very simplified game, there are two types of agents: good and bad.  The principal can 
choose one of two options based on the criteria for blacklisting: don’t blacklist or 
blacklist.  In the case of retail blacklists, the retailer hopes that the list affects consumer 
behavior by reducing return rates of bad behavior due to the threat of blacklisting.  A 
similar effect may be seen in the medical markets – a person may think twice before 
suing for medical malpractice before they file a claim given that they may be blacklisted 
from future medical treatment.  There is clearly a high cost if one is blacklisted. 
In order for the blacklist situation to be considered a game, there must be “mutual 
awareness of the cross effect,” (Dixit et al. 1999 pg. 12).  Retailers and medical 
professionals have a good idea about what the effects of returns and medical malpractice 
are on their respective professions.  If they choose to implement a system of retribution 
for undesirable behavior on the part of their customers or patients, then the customers 
have to be aware that the system exists before they will change their behavior.  The 
probabilities of landing on a blacklist need not be apparent to consumers or patients, in 
fact, if these probabilities are hidden then the blacklists will be more effective because 
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consumers and patients have no idea how far they can go before they are blacklisted, thus 
they may choose not to engage in the nefarious behavior at all.   
The payoffs in blacklists mostly accrue to the principal.  Because the retailer or 
medical professional makes the list, they make the rules.  The payoff of making effective 
rules is increased profitability or lower malpractice lawsuit numbers.  For the agent, the 
payoff is smaller and short-lived.  They can manipulate the principal for a short amount 
of time, but they know that at some point they will be blacklisted.  Whether or not they 
care to have a continuing relationship with the principal will determine the agent’s 
decision to be a good or bad customer.  However, not all customers or patients are bad.  
Good customers and patients may alter their behavior given they understand the 
rules of the game and are afraid of being blacklisted.  For example, consider a patient 
who undergoes a procedure that is botched by the doctor.  For this mistake, the patient 
may have a legitimate malpractice claim.  However, the threat of being placed on a 
blacklist may give the patient incentive to not file the malpractice claim.  In this case the 
game has been effective for the doctor, but it is inefficient in a larger sense because the 
lawsuit would have forced the transaction to be efficient, (i.e. the doctor must internalize 
the costs of botching the procedure).  Laws can deal with this inefficiency problem, 
which is discussed in the next section.  While the game could probably effectively reduce 
the occurrence of undesirable behavior, it may promote inefficiencies, especially with 
regard to medical malpractice issues.   
V. Issues Related to Law and Efficiency of Governing Blacklists 
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 “’A law is an obligation backed by a state sanction’… Lawmakers often ask, 
‘How will a sanction affect behavior?’… Economics provide(s) a scientific theory to 
predict the effects of legal sanctions on behavior.” (Cooter et al. 2004) 
Laws themselves are a kind of institution that society has developed in order to 
cope with market inefficiencies.  One of the functions of laws is to act as conveyors of 
information.  Specifically, laws communicate price information.  For example, a law that 
says breaking the speed limit defines the cost of speeding to you in terms of a fine and 
points off of your license.  Given that you know this price information, it is up to you to 
decide how fast to drive, or whether you are willing to pay the price for driving too fast at 
all.   
Laws can also be implemented to regulate markets.  From an economics 
perspective, laws that regulate markets should ensure that the market is efficient; that the 
marginal benefit of the transaction equals the marginal cost.  Efficiency is achieved when 
both parties in a transaction have complete information and parties have to internalize 
both explicit costs and externalities.  For example, if one was considering the interactions 
that occur in credit markets, it is important to examine the laws that govern the use of 
credit reports because these laws are meant to deal with the flaws in credit reporting.  
Credit reporting is extremely similar to blacklisting.  Both credit reporting and 
blacklisting deal with aggregated information about individuals.  The soundness of 
decisions made based on that information greatly depends on the quality of the 
information.  These similarities make a comparison between laws governing credit 
reporting and appropriate.  Laws governing credit reporting will be useful tools as 
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blacklists proliferate as they can provide templates for governing this type of information 
institution. 
V. A. Laws Governing the Credit Reporting Industry 
Credit reports are extremely important to the functioning of credit markets 
because they provide creditors with information about credit applicants that they might 
not otherwise be able to obtain.  Creditors can make more informed decisions about who 
to issue credit to.  Laws should support the formation and dissemination of credit reports 
given that they increase the efficiency of credit markets.  However, credit reports can also 
negatively affect those people trying to obtain credit.  Consider a person who has always 
had good credit behavior, but whose credit report is marred by a mistake.  This could be 
as simple as a keystroke error that mistakenly assigns a person a black mark or as serious 
as identity theft.  In either case, the creditor has bad information about the quality of the 
credit applicant and the individual may be wrongly denied credit.  The market is not 
functioning efficiently, so laws that stimulate efficiency are necessary.   
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the government body that regulates 
business practices.  The FTC describes consumer credit much the same terms that a new 
institutional economist would describe it: “An elaborate mechanism which has been 
developed for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit 
capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers.” (www.ftc.gov)  Among the 
divisions of the FTC, the Division of Financial Practices “is responsible for developing 
policy and enforcing laws related to financial and lending practices affecting consumers.” 
(www.ftc.gov)  The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is the primary body of law 
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regulating the use of credit reporting.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) is the 
second body of law that affects consumer credit: 
“The FCRA ensures the accuracy and privacy of information kept by 
credit bureaus and other consumer reporting agencies, and gives 
consumers the right to know what information these entities are 
distributing about them to creditors, insurance companies and employers.  
The GLBA requires financial institutions to provide notice to consumers 
about their information practices, and to give consumers an opportunity to 
direct that their personal information not be shared with non-affiliated 
third parties.” (www.ftc.gov) 
 Reading through the FTC website gives great insight into just how important the 
government views the role of information to be in the functioning of credit markets.  The 
introduction to the FTC’s consumer and business credit website begins, “Almost every 
day, you're involved in some type of financial transaction requiring an educated 
decision.” 
 Clearly, the negative effects of poor information on credit reports are felt most by 
the consumers whose records suffer the errors.  Especially in the U.S. economy, credit is 
necessary for day to day living, whether it is simply using credit cards or attempting to 
obtain a loan for a house.  The FTC has taken the role of protecting consumers against 
harm caused by incorrect or unfair reporting on their credit reports.  Consumers have the 
following rights regarding their credit reports (www.ftc.gov): 
• To be told if information in a credit report has been used against the individual, 
for example, if it has been used to deny credit. 
• To know what information is contained in the file if one of the following 
conditions applies: adverse action has been taken on the grounds of the information in 
the file, the consumer is the victim of identity theft, the consumer is on public 
assistance, and/or the consumer is employed or will be seeking employment within 60 
days. 
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• To ask for a credit score. 
• To dispute inaccurate or incomplete information on their credit report. 
• Credit reporting agencies must correct such inaccurate or incomplete information. 
• And many other rights related to credit reporting. 
 Enforcement of these rights increases the efficiency of credit markets because it 
improves the quality of the information used to make decisions in the market.  
Consumers have the right to know what information is contained in their reports and they 
have the right to dispute and correct inaccurate information.  Creditors have an obligation 
to correct problems.  While this may seem to benefit only the consumers, both parties in 
the market are better off because creditors have better information to use as well. 
V. B. Possibilities for Laws Governing Blacklists 
The extensive body of law that governs credit reports could be applied to 
blacklists.  It is not difficult to see how blacklists could promote inefficient behavior 
between parties.  There is the problem of adverse selection – good consumers like Ms. 
Salerno may choose to alter their purchasing behavior because they fear ending up on 
blacklists.  The information on the lists could be false in the case of identity theft or other 
fraud.  A myriad of errors and misinterpretation could lead to people being denied access 
to retail services or even medical care.  Obviously some controls could become necessary 
if use of the lists proliferate.  The more common they become, the more numerous the 
contributing parties will be, and thus the chance for errors increases.  The FTC may need 
to step in to regulate these lists in much the same way that credit reports have been 
regulated so that the information on the lists is good and the markets use them efficiently. 
VI. Conclusion 
The field of new institutional economics focuses on the institutions developed by 
society to cope with information asymmetries in markets and transactions.  One way for 
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agents to deal with information asymmetries is to collect as much information as possible 
and then take guesses about what the behavior of the other party in the transaction will be 
based on that information.  The emergence of consumer and medical blacklists represents 
such an institution.  In an effort to deal with shrinking profit margins due to excessive 
customer service costs, retailers have developed the lists so that they can identify and 
cultivate the angels while banishing the devils.  Medical blacklists perform a similar 
function, although the consequences for the devils are much more troubling; the prospect 
of anyone being denied medical care regardless of their malpractice history is troubling 
and is an issue that must be addressed by society as these lists proliferate.  Not only can 
the behavior provoked by blacklists be unfair, the lists can be flawed, resulting in 
inefficiencies in the markets due to bad information, not the lack of information.  
Especially in the case of medical lists, flaws in the institution must be corrected.  The 
legal institutions are best able to deal with these situations, just as they did the flaws in 
credit reporting.  While these systems are still in their infancies, it is certainly feasible 
that they will proliferate.  With the possibilities provided by information technology, 
networks containing consumer information to be used for the purposes of blacklisting 
could become commonplace, as could patient blacklisting networks.  While the ultimate 
purpose of these lists is to improve market efficiency, a desirable outcome, there remains 
the possibility of flaws in the system.  While development of efficiency improving 
institutions is good for society, society must be wary of the negative consequences of 
some actions that are based on the institutions and so must be prepared to cope with them 
as it has in the past. 
Quinn, Tess 
The Economics of Blacklists 
22 
Resources 
Buettner, Russ.  “Died After Nose Job.”  New York Daily News: Mar. 24 2005. 
<http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/293103p-250876c.html> 
Cha, Ariana Eunjung. (2004, November 7). ”Electronic Blacklists” Irk Consumers, 
Patients.  The Denver Post.  
Chapman, John M. and Shay, Robert P.  The Consumer Finance Industry: Its Costs and 
Regulation.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 
Ciardi, John.  A Second Browser’s Dictionary and Native’s Guide to the Unknown 
American Language.  New York:  Harper & Row, 1983. 
Cooter, Robert and Ulen, Thomas.  Law and Economics.  Boston: Pearson, 2004. 
Dixit, Avinash, and Skeath, Susan.  Games of Strategy.  New York: WW. Norton & Co., 
1999. 
Feder, Barbara.  “Web Site to Track Lawsuit Plaintiffs Causes Blacklist Concerns.” San 
Jose Mercury News. 5 Mar. 2004. 
<http://web36.epnet.com/DeliveryPrintSave.asp>   
Fricke, Cedric V., Mao, James C.T. and McCracken, Paul W.  Consumer Installment 
Credit and Public Policy.  Ann Arbor: Bureau of Business Research, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, The University of Michigan, 1965. 
Hirsch, E.D., Kett, Joseph F. and Trefil, James.  The Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: 
What Every American Needs to Know.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988. 
Hogstrom, Erik.  “Hospital Officials See Hope for Bush Policies.” Telegraph Herald. 6 
Nov. 2004.  < http://web.lexis- nexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/universe/ 
Quinn, Tess 
The Economics of Blacklists 
23 
document?_m=d2df170d8044a60b013910e72ad28dd0&_docnum=2&wchp=dGL
bVtz-zSkVb&_md5=3c8a36108507b62efe93c896e337b674> 
Mandell, Lewis.  The Credit Card Industry: A History.  Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1990. 
Masters, Greg.  “Best Buy Differentiates With Service.” Retail Merchandiser: January, 
2005. <http://199.249.170.192/retailmerchandiser/reports_analysis/ 
feature_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000745650> 
McWilliams, Gary.  “The Customer Isn’t Always Right.” The Wall Street Journal. 
(January 2005)  
O’Brien, James M.  Studies in Selective Credit Policies.  Philadelphia: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, 1975. 
Ray, Don. (2005, January).  FACTS’ Unsettling Facts.  WARD’S DealerBusiness, pg. 29. 
(2005, January) “Final Rules Issued For Use of Credit Report Data”.  HR News pg. 35-
36. 
Wagenseil, Paul.  “Woman Won’t Leave Hospital.” 21 Feb. 2005.  Fox News.  21 Feb. 
2005. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148287,00.html. 
“Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice.”  Congressional Budget Office: 
January 8th, 2004.  Available: 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4968&sequence=0 
